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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 July 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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\*Republic of the Congo: Belgian troops, who have been used against the mutineers of the Force Publique in several major centers, have apparently facilitated the escape of refugees and restored a modicum of control where they have been employed. Brussels has announced that the Belgian force in the Congo will be reinforced to about 5200, but this may be inadequate to restore order unless the present trend toward disintegration of the 24,000 man Force Publique can be reversed. The deteriorating situation appears to favor renewed African efforts to form a separate state in Katanga province, although these attempts may be delayed until a degree of order has been restored there.

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OK India: New Delhi's action in banning strikes in "essential services" seems unlikely to forestall a threatened walkout at midnight on 11 July of two million government employees of the railways, central government offices, armaments industry, and postal and telegraph services. While a last-minute settlement is possible, neither the government's ban nor Prime Minister Nehru's personal appeal to the nation is likely to prevent hard-core elements of the socialist and Communist unions involved from leading at least some of their followers off the job, thereby forcing Nehru to use the army to maintain essential services and to take the repressive measures he hopes to avoid. [redacted] (Page 3)

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### III. THE WEST

OK Italy: The Communist-led rioting in Italy has not reached a point where Premier Tambroni's government has been forced to call out troops. Nevertheless, his Christian Democratic party remains weak and divided on the issue of retaining neo-Fascist parliamentary support. Further disorders are in prospect and could lead to demonstrations against NATO installations. As yet no new steps have been taken to set up a more representative center-left government. The pressing need to maintain law and order may encourage Tambroni to try to form an authoritarian regime, although there are strong forces in the Christian Democratic party which would resist such a development. An authoritarian government would give the Communists an opportunity to emerge from their isolation and move to take over the leadership of the democratic left. [redacted] (Page 4)

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DAILY BRIEF

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OK  
\*Cuba-USSR: Khrushchev's bombastic words assuring Castro of Soviet support have emboldened Cuban leaders who may now act even more recklessly toward the United States. This possibility was strongly suggested in the speeches made by Castro's top associates during the 10 July mass rally. President Dorticos' speech may foreshadow an early request for abandonment of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. The Soviet premier's vaguely worded missile threat, however, will probably help solidify anti-Castro sentiment among the governments and peoples of the rest of Latin America and will serve to identify the Castro regime even more intimately with the Soviet bloc. One Latin American diplomat believes Khrushchev's statement may have removed the last chance of a "moderate" solution of the Cuban problem. Meanwhile, according to the press, Cuba intends to bring its dispute with the US before the UN Security Council. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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### Indian Government Workers' Strike Is Banned

New Delhi's outlawing of work stoppages in "essential services" seems unlikely to forestall the threatened walkout at midnight on 11 July of about 2,000,000 government employees in the railways, the central government offices, the armaments industry, and the postal and telegraph services. The ban--a presidential ordinance issued in the absence of Parliament--provides for arrests without warrant and calls for jail sentences of up to a year and fines of up to 1,000 rupees (\$210) for strikers and agitators. New Delhi reportedly will use the army, if necessary, to maintain order and operate essential services.

Prime Minister Nehru last week made a radio appeal in which he urged the public to discourage those bent on striking. Labor leaders, however, still say they will defy the strike ban.

Negotiations between the unions and the government broke down on 2 July. Among other demands, the unions insist on an increase of about two thirds in the minimum monthly wage and the linking of government wages to the cost-of-living index. Nehru described these demands as "not feasible" at this time and asserted that, in addition to hampering economic progress, the proposed strike would deal a "dangerous blow" to national security efforts. He is also aware, however, that too repressive a policy will hurt the Congress party's own labor organization, which, although dissociating itself from the strike, is under stiff competition from the rival Communist trade union organization.

While a last-minute settlement is possible, neither the government's antistrike ordinance nor the prime minister's personal appeal is likely to prevent hard-core elements of the socialist and Communist unions involved from leading some of their followers off the job, thereby forcing Nehru to take the repressive measures he hopes to avoid. [REDACTED]

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Italian Disorders Continue

The Communist-led disorders in Italy, although they have not thus far necessitated calling out troops, underline the dangers attendant upon the continuing aimless drift of the Italian Government. The ruling Christian Democrats are postponing a clear-cut choice between their present reliance on neo-Fascist parliamentary support, an alliance which sparked the disorders, and a more representative center-left government, which is opposed by the ruling party's minority right wing. If the Christian Democrats fail to make a definite political decision within the next few months, Premier Tambroni may attempt to establish an authoritarian regime. There is strong opposition in his party to such a course, which would polarize Italian politics by dividing the country into national and popular fronts. Current efforts to put together a new government formula are inhibited not only by the chronic disunity among the center parties but by reluctance to suggest that the Communists have won a victory.

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The Communists are probably not interested in bringing down the government as long as its repressive measures are useful to their own cause. The present situation enables them to pose as champions of Italian liberty and may draw other leftist elements into their orbit. Continuation of the disorders would make it increasingly difficult for the Nenni Socialists to maintain political autonomy from the Communists, who could thus emerge from isolation.

Italian Communist chief Togliatti's statements on his return from Moscow, coupled with the violence and extent of the disturbances in Italy, suggest that Moscow is making a major effort to exploit the situation. The Soviet leaders may feel that the Italian situation can be used to advance their larger objective of discrediting the United States, weakening the NATO alliance, and eliminating NATO bases on Italian soil.

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